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I. INTRODUCTION
The evidence is strong that abstract payment undertakings1 have
finally arrived. Long confused with their dependent siblings, the
suretyship undertaking and the secondary' guaranty,3 the
independent nature of these primary undertakings is now largely
recognized. More compelling evidence of the surge in independent
undertaking recognition lies in the fact that merchants and banks
have now differentiated three of them: the commercial letter of
credit,5 the standby letter of credit,6 and the independent
1. The generic term, abstract payment undertaking, which applies to standby
and commercial letters of credit and to independent or first demand bank
guarantees, is Roy Goode's. See Roy Goode, Abstract Payment Undertakings in
International Transactions, 22 BRooK.J. INT'LL. 1 (1996); Roy Goode, Abstract
Payment Undertakings and the Rules of the International Chamber of Commerce,
39 ST. Louis U. L.J. 725 (1995).
2. This paper will not indulge in the debate, fostered by some, that there is
no real difference between Goode's abstract payment undertakings and
secondary obligations such as bonds, suretyship obligations, or guaranties. For
some of the better arguments, see Peter A. Alces, An Essay on Independence,
Interdependence, and the Suretyship Principle, 1993 U. ILL. L. REV. 447; Amelia H.
Boss, Suretyship and Letters of Credit: Subrogation Revisited, 34 WM & MARY L.
REv. 1087 (1993); Neil Cohen, Subrogation: A Further Probing, LETIERS OF
CREDIT REPORT, Sept.-Oct. 1995, at 5.
3. In this paper, as in most of the commercial literature, the term "guaranty"
refers to the secondary obligation; the term "guarantee" refers to the independent
abstract payment obligation issued by European banks as a product similar in
function to but different in form from the standby letter of credit. See, e.g., Jean
Stoufflet, Recent Developments in the Law ofInternational Bank Guarantees in
France and Belgium, 4 ARIZ.J. INT'L&COMP. L. 48 (1987); Egon Guttman, Bank
Guarantees and Standby Letters of Credit: Moving Toward a Uniform Approach, 56
BROOK. L. REv. 167 (1990).
4. See, e.g., 12 C.F.R. 7.1016 (1998); United Nations Convention on
Independent Guarantees and Stand-by Letters of Credit (1995), reprinted in JOHN
F. DOLAN, THE LAW OF LETTERS OF CREDIT App. F (rev. ed. 1999).
5. The commercial letter of credit usually arises in connection with the
international sale of goods. In this transaction, the buyer of the goods causes its
bank to issue the credit in favor of the seller. The buyer thus "applies" for the
credit and is the "applicant." The seller is the party to whom the credit runs, that
is, the "beneficiary" of the credit. Often, the issuer causes a bank in the seller's
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guarantee.7 But, the jewel in the independent undertaking's crown
of recognition is the fact that commercial lawyers have now
fashioned five legal regimes to govern these undertakings: (1)
Article 5 of the Uniform Commercial Code,' (2) the Uniform
Customs and Practice for Documentary Credits (UCP500),9 (3) the
United Nations Convention on Independent Guarantees and
Standby Letters of Credit,10 (4) the Uniform Rules for Demand
Guarantees (URDG)," and (5) the International Standby Practices
1998 (1SP98). 12
This Article analyzes the latest of these regimes, ISP98, in light
market, the nominated bank, to advise the credit. Frequently, the adviser will
also confirm the credit or at least pay it under the issuer's mandate. For an
illustrative case, see Ng Chee Chong v. Austin Taylor & Co., 1 Lloyd's Rep. 156
(Q.B. 1975).
6. There seems to be no limit to the number and variety of transactions out
of which the standby can arise. Standby credits can secure any executory
obligation. Illustrative transactions include the obligation of a promisor under
a promissory note, see Republic Nat'l Bank v. Northwest Nat'l Bank, 578
S.W.2d 109 (Tex. 1978), the duty of a contractor to complete subdivision
improvements, see McGee Constr. Co. v. Neshobe Dev., Inc., 594 A.2d 415 (Vt.
1991), or the obligation of a parent to return children to a divorced spouse under
a child custody agreement, see In re Tischendorf, 321 N.W.2d 405 (Minn. 1982).
In the standby transaction, there is usually only one bank, the issuer of the
standby. The person obligated on the underlying executory obligation is the
applicant. The beneficiary is the party to whom the applicant owes the
executory obligation. Compare this transaction with the commercial latter of
credit transaction previously described. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
7. For discussion of the independent guarantee, see ROELANDF. BERTRAMS,
BANK GUARANTEES IN INTERNATIONAL TRADE (2d rev. ed. 1996).8. u.C.C. % 5-101-117 (1999).
9. INTERNATIONAL CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, PUB. NO. 500, UNIFORM
CUSTOMS AND PRACTICE FOR DOCUMENTARY CREDITS (1993).
10. The UN Convention, supra note 4, was promulgated by UNCITRAL,
the trade arm of the United Nations in 1995. It has been ratified by five
countries, not including the United States, which is, nonetheless, a signatory
without Senate ratification.
11. INTERNATIONAL CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, PUB. No. 458, UNIFORM
RULES FOR DEMAND GUARANTEES (1992).
12. INTERNATIONAL CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, PUB. No. 590,
INTERNATIONAL STANDBY PRACTICES ISP98 (1998).
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of the notion that rules, especially when they compete with other
regimes, should give considerable deference to efficiency notions.
To an extent the Article also measures ISP98 comparatively to two
of the other regimes13 with regard to the same efficiency interest.
The Article reaches two conclusions: First, that ISP98 in many
respects has struck a balance that renders it inefficient by imposing
educational and other transaction costs on the commercial parties,14
who are less able to bear them, rather than on the banks that issue
standby credits; second, that letter of credit users, that is, the
commercial parties that purchase standby letters of credit from the
banking industry, are well-advised to insist that the rules be
incorporated selectively, an insistence that will increase those costs,
or to eschew ISP98 entirely, the less transaction costly course.
II. THE RuBIN THESES
In two articles, Professor Edward Rubin has posited two theses
in connection with the fashioning of payments law that have
relevance to the evaluation of ISP98.' First, Rubin argued that the
13. ISP98, UCP 500, and URDG do not compete with Articles of the
Uniform Commercial Code or with the UN Convention. Rather, they
supplement the statute and the convention, which relate primarily to the
structure of letter of credit governance and are, therefore, amenable to industry
fashioned rules. The drafters of Article 5 explicitly endorse that conclusion. See
U.C.C. 9 5-101 cmt., paras. 34 (1999). The UN Convention is less explicit,
referring to such external rules obliquely only in the article dealing with
documentary compliance. See United Nations Convention, supra note 4, at art.
16(1).
14. By "commercial parties" this Article means the beneficiary who receives
the credit issuer's obligation, and the applicant, the party that causes the credit
to issue. Often banks will apply for standby credits and just as or even more
often credits will run to bank beneficiaries.
15. See Edward L. Rubin, Thinking Like A Lawryer, Acting Like a Lobbyist.
Some Notes on the Process ofRevising U. C. C. Article 3 and 4, 26 LoY. L.A. L. REV.
743 (1993) [hereinafter Rubin, Thinking]; Edward L. Rubin, Efficiency, Equityand
the ProposedRevision ofArticles 3 and 4, 42 ALA. L. REV. 551 (1991) [hereinafter
Rubin, Efficiency]; cf. Robert D. Cooter & Edward L. Rubin, A Theory ofLoss
Allocationfor Consumer Payments, 66 TEX. L. REV. 63 (1987) (developing some
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absence of consumer representatives at the drafting table16 skewed
the statutory result away from consumer interests and in favor of
the well-represented banking interests. He claimed that such a result
was not the product of any conspiracy of bank lawyers against
consumers, but was a consequence of conceptual frameworks
peculiar to lawyers representing banking interests that the bank
lawyers brought with them to the drafting process.17 Second, Rubin
contended that allocation of costs in a statutory product will yield
waste if that allocation puts costs on parties who, often by virtue of
information asymmetry, are less well able to shoulder them than
another party.18
This Article accepts these theses as valid instruments for
analyzing the efficiency of public law such as Articles 3 and 4 of the
Uniform Commercial Code (UCC). This Article takes the analysis
one step further by advancing the theory that Rubin's theses apply
equally well to rules such as ISP98 that effect the private ordering
of commercial relationships.
III. ISP98 DRAFTING PROCESS
The International Standby Practices (1SP98) were issued in draft
form in the fall of 1997. In April of 1998, after some revision, the
ISP98 received a significant endorsement when the Commission on
Banking Technique and Practice of the International Chamber of
Commerce ICC), 9 with some dissent, 0 approved them and
of the efficiency argument)'.
16. Articles 3 and 4 of the Uniform Commercial Code were drafted by a
committee consisting largely of Commissioners from the National Conference
of Commissioners on Uniform States Laws. See Rubin, Thinking, supra note 15,
at 74448.
17. See id. at 752-53.
18. See Rubin, Efficiency, supra note 15, at 561-70.
19. The Commission on Banking Technique and Practice of the
International Chamber of Commerce (the Commission) is the group squarely
responsible for drafting and revising the Uniform Customs and Practice for
Documentary Credits, whose latest version is UCP 500. See INTERNATIONAL
CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, supra note 9. The Commission is active in fielding
20001 1869
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recommended their adoption by the ICC. The International
Institute of Banking Law and Practice, Inc., the main sponsor of
ISP98, and ICC Publishing ultimately agreed to the publication of
the Rules, which are available for banks to incorporate into their
standby credits as of January 1, 1999.21
The principal drafter of the Rules is Professor James Byrne,
who has authored an extensive "official commentary" of the
Rules?2 He was chair of the ISP Working Group that served as the
drafting committee for the Rules.' James Barnes, a Chicago lawyer,
was the vice chair.24 Byrne and Barnes have collaborated often in
American Bar Association reports concerning letters of credit.
inquiries from banks regarding UCP 500 and otherwise explaining the UCP. See
GARY COLLYER, MORE QUERIEs AND RESPONSES ONUCP 500 1997, OPINIONS
OF ICC BANKING COMMISSION ([CC Pub. No. 596, 1998); GARY COLLYER,
OPINIONS OF THE ICC BANKING COMMISSION 1995-1996 RESPONSES TO
QUERIES ON UCP 400, UCP 500, AND URC 222, (ICC Pub. No. 565, 1997);
CHARLES DEL BUSTO, CASE STUDIES ONDOCUMENTARY CREDITS UNDER UCP
500 ([CC Pub. No. 535, 1995); CHARLES DEL BUSTO, THE NEW STANDARD
DOCUMENTARY CREDIT FORMS FOR THE UCP 500 (ICC Pub. No. 516, 1993);
CHARLES DEL BUSTO, ICC GUIDE TO DOCUMENTARY CREDIT OPERATIONS
FOR THE UCP 500 ([CC Pub. No. 515, 1994); ICC, UCP 500 & 400 COMPARED,
AN ARTICLE BY ARTICLE DETAILED ANALYSIS OF THE NEW UCP 500
COMPARED WITHTHE UCP400 ([CCPuB.NO. 511,1993). The Commission also
sponsored the URDG. See INTERNATIONAL CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, supra
note 11; ICC; ROY GOODE, GUIDETOTHEICCUNIFORMRULESFORDEMAND
GUARANTEES (ICC Pub. No. 510, 1992).
20. There is some flavor in the newsletters that the U.S. bankers "rammed"
approval of ISP98 through the Commission. A report from an ICC affiliate
announced that the vote of the Commission was 32 in favor and 9 opposed, with
46 Commission members abstaining or failing to participate. See, e.g., News
Briefs, DOCUMENTARY CREDITS INSIGHT (ICC, Paris), Spring 1998 at, 24.
21. See ISP98 Title Page.
22. See JAMES E. BYRNE, THE OFFICIAL COMMENTARY ON THE
INTERNATIONAL STANDBY PRACTICE (1998).
23. See id. at XVfI-XIX.
24. See id. at 18.
25. See, e.g., James G. Barnes & James E. Byrne, Letters of Credit: 1996 Cases,
52 BUS. LAW. 1547 (1997); James G. Barnes &James E. Byrne, Revision ofArticle
5,50 BUS. LAW. 1449 (1995); James G. Barnes &James E. Byrne, Letters of Credit
1994 Cases, 50 BUS. LAw. 1517 (1995).
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The sponsors of the Rules are the Institute of International
Banking Law & Practice, Inc., of which Professor Byrne is
director;26 the International Financial Services Association [FSA),
an international bank trade organization;27 three money center
banks;2" the National Law Center for Inter-American Free Trade
at the University of Arizona College of Law, of which Professor
Boris Kozolchyk is president and director; 9 and Baker &
McKenzie, the law firm with which Mr. Barnes practices. The
identification of the sponsors is relevant to this inquiry because
virtually all sponsors are connected to banking. Mr. Barnes
represents the IFSA.3" Professor Byrne is the editor in chief of
Documentary Credit World, a letter of credit newsletter that is
sponsored jointly by his Institute for International Banking Law &
Practice, Inc. and the IFSA 1 Professor Byrne's Institute and an
affiliate of the IFSA have also sponsored seminars in letters of
credit.32 Barnes and Byrne have also worked together as expert
witnesses or counsel in letter of credit cases.33 Professor Kozolchyk
26. See THE 1998 ANNUAL SURVEY OF LETTER OF CREDrr LAW &PRACTICE
Title Page (1998).
27. For a brief history of the IFSA, formerly the United States Council on
International Banking (USCIB), see Introducing the USCIB, DocUMENTARY
CREDrr WORLD, Oct. 1997, at 16. The IFSA maintains aweb site that describes
its activities. See <http://www.intlbanking.org> (last visited Feb. 22, 1999).
28. Citibank, N.A., The Chase Manhattan Bank, and ABN-AMRO. See
INTERNATIONAL CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, supra note 12, at 9.
29. See ASSOCIATION OF AMERICAN LAW SCHOOLS, THE AALS
DIRECTORY OF LAW TEACHERS 1998-99 605 (1998).
30. See James J. White, The Influence oflnternational Practice on the Revision
ofArticle 5 ofthe UCC, 16 NW. J. INT'L L. & BUs. 189, 213-14 (1995); cf. United
States Council on International Banking, Newsletter (last modified Jan. 1997)
<http://www.intlbanking.org/ net0197.htm> (referring to Mr. Barnes as
acting as "counsel" for the USCIB, now the IFSA).
31. See IFSA Web Site, (visited Feb. 25, 1999)
< http://www.intlbanking.org/ pub.htm >.
32. See Article 5 Seminar (flyer on file with The Wayne Law Review)
(describing seminars in New York, Seattle, Chicago, San Francisco, and Los
Angeles in 1997).
33. See James G. Barnes & James E. Byrne, Letters of Credit: 1996 Cases, 52
1871
THE WAYNE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 45:1865
was the IFSA's representative to the drafting of the Uniform
Customs and Practice (UCP 500) and continued to represent the
IFSA from 1989 through 1995.1' The ISP Working Group that
drafted the Rules, moreover, consisted largely of bankers."
That is not to say that the drafters of the Rules were unmindful
of the need to consult with standby credit users. Professor Byrne
has taken pains to explain the steps the Working Group took to
consult the entire standby credit community when the Group
fashioned the Rules. 6 One must acknowledge, furthermore, that
the drafters of the Rules could not, with any common sense, neglect
the views of the standby user. If the user sees the Rules as unfair, it
will eschew them and the drafters' efforts to standardize and
harmonize standby practices will suffer.
Yet, the drafters and the sponsors' intimacy with bankers and
banking might have had the effect Professor Rubin identified in the
UCC drafting process. As the following analysis of the Rules
suggests, the effect that Professor Rubin observed may well have
played a role in the drafting of the Rules.
There were non-bankers and non-bank lawyers involved in the
fashioning of the ISP98. The ICC's participation may have
resulted in modification of the original drafts of the Rules. The
published version of the Rules, however, remains significantly
different in form and subtly different in substance from other ICC
publications in the realm of abstract undertaking law.38 The
Bus. LAW. 1547, 1547 n.*(1997).
34. See ASSOCIATION OF AMERICAN LAW SCHOOLS, supra note 29, at 605.
35. See BYRNE, supra note 22, at xix.
36. See James E. Byrne, Standby Rulemaking: A Glimpse at the Elements of
Standardization and Harmonization of Banking Practice, NEW DEv. IN INT'L
COM. AND CONSUMER L. 135, 149 (1998) (hereafter James E. Byrne, "Standby
Rulemaking").
37. See INTERNATIONAL CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, supra note 12, at 10.
38. Compare INTERNATIONAL CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, supra note 12,
with INTERNATIONAL CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, supra note 9, INTERNATIONAL
CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, supra note 11, and INTERNATIONAL CHAMBER OF
COMMERCE, PUB. No. 525, UNIFORM RULES FOR BANK-To-BANK
REIMBURSEMENTS UNDER DOCUMENTARY CREDITS (URR) (1995).
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differences relate foremost to detail. ISP98 is filled with detail, and
no issuer, beneficiary, or applicant should deal with a standby
subject to these rules without studying them. It is not the case that
ISP98 fills in the blanks of relationships with expected terms, at
least not until ISP98 becomes well known. Many of the details of
ISP98 are, in fact, unexpected or idiosyncratic. That is not to say
they are unfair, though some courts might so decide. All of the
rules, including those that are unexpected or idiosyncratic, have
principled bases.
IV. EVALUATING THE RULES
It is worth initiating this evaluation by asking why the banking
community that organized and sustained the ISP98 effort bothered.
The Uniform Customs and Practice have, since 1983,3" included
standby letters of credit within their scope. Furthermore, the
URDG, a product of the ICC Banking Commission, govern
independent bank guarantees, which, while different in form, are
functionally the equivalent of the standby. Courts, in fact, have
applied standby credit law to the independent bank guarantee4 and
scholars are in general agreement that the same law should apply to
them.41 Finally, the United Nations Convention on Independent
39. The first version of the UCP to include standby credits was UCP 400.
See INTERNAThONAL CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, PUB. No. 400, UNIFoRM
CUSTOMS AND PRACTICE FOR DOCUMENTARY CREDrTs art. 1 (1983).
40. See, e.g., American Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. Hamilton Indus. Int'l,
Inc., 583 F. Supp. 164 (N.D. Ill. 1984), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Banque
Paribas v. Hamilton Indus. Int'l, Inc., 767 F.2d 380 (7th Cir. 1985); United
Trading Corp. v. Allied Arab Bank Ltd., 2 Lloyd's Rep. 554 (C.A. 1985); RD
Harbottle (Mercantile) Ltd. v. National Westminster Bank, 2 All E.R. 862 (Q.B.
1977).
41. See ROY GOODE, COMMERCIAL LAW 1035-38 (2d ed. 1995); E. Peter
Ellinger, Performance Bonds, First-Demand Guarantees and Standby Letters of
Credit-A Comparison, LEITERsoF CREDrrREPORT, May-June 1987, at 1; Egon
Guttman, Bank Guarantees and Standby Letters of Credit: Moving Toward a
Unifom Approach, 56 BROOK. L. REV. 167 (1990).
1873
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Guarantees and Stand-by Letters of Credit,42 as its title suggests,
governs standby credits. It is legitimate to ask, then, why the U.S.
banking community found these regimes inadequate to deal with
the standby and felt compelled to fashion a new one.
UCP 500 is essentially a set of rules for commercial letters of
credit. It is not difficult to make the case that incorporating UCP
500 into standby credits is unwise. Professor Byrne has made that
case in some detail.43 Many provisions in UCP 500 are inapplicable
to most standby credits," and some provisions are harmful to the
standby.45 It is enough to say here that a separate regime for standby
credits is a reasonable alternative to UCP 500, though many
standby credits have incorporated the UCP.
The URDG, however, are free from the two inadequacies that
plague UCP 500. The URDG do not contain a passel of unneeded
provisions and, it is fair to say, contain none that are inimical to the
standby. That conclusion is not surprising. The URDG were
fashioned for a product that is largely a standby equivalent and it
may be only an accident of banking politics that the URDG did not
cover standby credits in the first place.
It appears that at the time the ICC Banking Commission
42. See United Nations Convention, supra note 4.
43. See generally Byrne, supra note 36, at 14549. The problems arise by
virtue of the differences between the standby and the commercial credit. Proper
regard for the standby's common functions requires issuers to adopt UCP 500
selectively.
44. UCP 500 generally deals with questions of documentary compliance
under commercial letters of credit. Thus, many articles in UCP 500 deal with
transport documents, insurance documents, and invoices, all of which seldom
arise in standby credits; and if they do, they play a much less significant role than
in the commercial credit transaction. See INTERNATIONAL CHAMBER OF
COMMERCE, supra note 9, arts. 23-37.
45. The installment drawing rule of UCP 500 art. 41 is particularly unsuited
for standby credits. That article causes a credit to expire if the beneficiary does
not draw on an installment. In the standby credit, the failure to draw on an
installment may simply mean that the applicant has paid the beneficiary directly.
In the commercial credit, it means that the beneficiary has failed to make a
required shipment. For further discussion of inhospitable provisions in UCP 500
for the standby, see Byrne, supra note 36.
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decided to draft a regime for independent bank guarantees, U.S.
bankers were largely left out of the process. Independent bank
guarantees have traditionally been the product of European banks.
The chair of the URDG Drafting Group was Professor Roy Goode
from St. John's College Oxford, and the major participants,
understandably, were not U.S. Bankers." U.S. bankers were,
however, very much involved in the drafting of UCP 500,
promulgated in 1993.'z It may be, then, that the U.S. bankers, who
had achieved a measure of hegemony in the UCP drafting process,
were unhappy at the prospect of having a European law professor
and European bankers draft rules for the quintessential U.S.
product, the standby credit. Whatever the reason, UCP 500,
promulgated the year after the URDG, continued to cover the
standby, even though the URDG regime is far more congenial to
the standby than UCP 500.
Ultimately, U.S. bankers decided that UCP 500 was indeed
sufficiently inhospitable to the standby such that there was a need
for a separate regime. By the time they acknowledged that need, the
URDG, with no mention of the standby and no incorporation of
standby locution, was in place.
This vignette of drafting history takes on some significance by
virtue of the fact that the provisions of ISP98 that may be
inefficient and unfair are completely absent from the URDG. That
absence may reflect the inadequacy of the URDG or it may reflect
the reason that U.S. bankers have been dissatisfied with the URDG.
That is not to say, however, that ISP98 is solely an attempt to
foist inefficient and unfair rules on standby users. It isn't. ISP98
46. See INTERNATIONAL CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, supra note 11, at 2-3.
The U.S. bankers were not involved partly because the independent bank
guarantee has traditionally not been a product that U.S. banks market. The U.S.
banks sell the standby.
47. The chair of the drafting group was Charles del Busto, aU.S. banker. See
CHARLES DEL BUSTO, DOCUMENTARY CREDITS: UCP 500 & 400 COMPARED
iii-v (international Chamber of Commerce Pub. No. 511, 1993). Professor Boris
Kozolchyk, the IFSA's representative to the drafting sessions also played a major
role. See id; Boris Kozolchyk, Strict Compliance and the Reasonable Document
Checker, 56 BROOK. L. REV. 45 (1990).
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contains much that clarifies standby practice.4" The history of the
drafting efforts may explain, nonetheless, the reasons that the
drafting group for ISP98 may have gone overboard in a few
respects.
V. EVALUATING THE FAIRNESS OF ISP98
The second question in evaluating ISP98 is to ask why letter of
credit users need them. For some time, versions of the Uniform
Customs have acknowledged their appropriate role in standby
credit practice.49 The URDG, moreover, governs an undertaking,
the independent bank guarantee, different in form but identical in
function to the standby."
At the time the ICC Banking Commission adopted the URDG,
the Commission had concluded that the UCP could govern letters
of credit adequately, be those credits commercials or standbys. In
retrospect, it may have been more efficient to fashion the URDG
for both independent bank guarantees and standby credits.
Ultimately, the ICC lost the initiative to the Institute of
International Banking Law and Practice, Inc., which turned out to
be rather closely allied with U.S. banking interests, particularly the
International Financial Services Association (IFSA).
The Institute's initiative has had two effects on the rules that
now are supposed to govern standby credits."' The style of ISP98 is
more detailed than that of the ICC rules and mercifully clearer;
however, the ISP are arguably less balanced than typical ICC
products.
48. See generally Paul S. Turner, New Rulesfor Standby Letters of Credit: The
International Standby Practices, 14 BANKING & FIN. L. REV. 457 (1999).
49. See INTERNATIONAL CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, supra note 9, art. 1;
INTERNATIONAL CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, supra note 39, art. 1.
50. See sources cited supra note 41.
51. The ISP98 rules say they are for international standby credits, but if
UCP practice is any indication of what the practices will be, banks will fashion
only one generic form for the standby credits and will incorporate ISP98 into it
and will use it indiscriminately for standby transactions, be they international
or domestic.
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Deciding whether the inclusion of detail is excessive must abide
experience. There is certainly a calculated risk in detailing rules as
much as ISP98 details them. 2 Details can put the parties in a
straitjacket. The ISP98 sponsors, however, have announced that
they intend to issue revisions to ISP98 periodically; it may be that
they will use those revisions to deal with any problems that appear
in the details. One must acknowledge, furthermore, that the ISP
drafters' election to include the detail is a principled effort to
provide direction to issuers, commercial parties, and courts.
Unfortunately, the details exacerbate what the following discussion
suggests is unevenness in the Rules. The ISP contain a number of
unexpected provisions, all of them favoring issuers over commercial
parties. All of these rules are defensible in principle. They
inevitably, in a competitive market such as that for standby credits,
reduce the nominal cost of standbys. Yet, by virtue of information
asymmetry in the standby transaction, the ISP allocation of risk is
often inefficient. By foisting the loss on an unsuspecting party who
may be less able than an issuer to protect itself, the ISP may actually
increase the cost of standbys, a consequence harmful to commercial
parties. That consequence may also be harmful to the banking
interests that fashioned ISP98. In a knowledgeable market, an
increase in the standby's cost (whether in its price or in its
allocation of risk) renders the product less attractive and less
successful in competing with obligations such as bonds, secondary
guarantees, and other suretyship undertakings.
52. The significant success of the original Article 5 of the UCC lay in its
refusal to accommodate requests for detail. Rather, Article 5 in its original
version posited a framework for letters of credit. See U.C.C. S 5-101 cmt. (1962).
That framework proved remarkably sturdy. It served commerce well throughout
the growth of commercial credits in international trade and provided structure
for the standby when it began its signal role in domestic commerce. Wisely, the
drafters of revised Article 5 have elected to follow a similar course of establishing
a framework and leaving the details to commercial parties, bankers, and to other
law. See id.
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VI. INFORMATION ASYMMETRY
The first problem relates to information asymmetry. In any
multi-party relationship, there is bound to be a measure of this
asymmetry. Yet, the party with superior knowledge that fashions
governing rules in a way that exploits that asymmetry may expect
a measure of correction from the market or from the courts. If
ISP98 favors banks over commercial parties in a setting where the
banks are information rich and the commercial parties information
poor, the commercial parties, once they learn about it, will be
inclined to insist that their standby credits not incorporate ISP98.
That is a rational market response, and it is one that will detract
from the whole ISP effort. Similarly, courts that identify the
situation as information asymmetrical and then see rules that are
bound to catch commercial parties by surprise will be inclined to
distort or reject the Rules.
Banks were more than well represented in the drafting of
ISP98, just as they were well represented in the drafting of UCP
500 and the URDG. Yet, the significantly high measure of detail in
the former and the absence of that detail in the two latter regimes
matters. Banks will know the Rules well and will be able to price
their products in a setting rich with information. But, commercial
parties, applicants, and beneficiaries, do not enjoy the same level of
information. If past experience is any indication, commercial parties
will not have copies of the ISP in their libraries. Many of them do
not have law libraries. When a bank issues a standby to them that
is "subject to ISP 1998," they might reasonably assume that the ISP
is a compilation of industry standards designed to fill in the blanks
of the credit with terms that are generally familiar to everyone.
That assumption would be wrong, for the ISP contain provisions
that would surprise the commercial parties.
The purpose of this essay is not to criticize the drafters of ISP98,
who charged themselves with the onerous responsibility of drafting
rules that must satisfy hundreds of banks, rating agencies, central
bankers, and international commercial organizations. No group of
drafters ever fashions a perfect product. Yet, there are serious
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problems with ISP98, and it is worth noting them. The fact that the
drafters do not appear to see them as problems may well be a
consequence of the factors that Professor Rubin has documented.53
Banks that issue most standby credits could attach a copy of
ISP98 to their credits or could in some attention-catching fashion
bring to the attention of their customers that the standby credits are
now subject to a new regime with rules that differ markedly from
the rules that formerly applied. Such practices would blunt much
of the criticism advanced in this paper. Until the banks do make
serious efforts to educate commercial parties and until that
education diminishes what is bound to be significant asymmetry in
knowledge and understanding of ISP98, banks that incorporate
ISP98 into their standby credits run the risk of being charged with
unfairness.
VIi. UNFAIRNESS IN THE COMMERCIAL SETTING
ISP98 provisions that catch commercial parties unaware are, by
themselves, arguably insufficient to render the Rules unfair. Of
course, one might take the position that in a freedom of contract
regime, all provisions in a contract, even provisions of which one
party is unlikely to be aware, govern the relationship. Another
view might be that all terms that surprise one of the parties are
unenforceable. Probably, no court would seriously entertain either
of those positions today. Thus, we are forced to say that only some
surprising provisions are unenforceable; and there must be a
principled basis for determining which surprising terms are unfair
and which are not. There are two views on unfairness in
commercial relationships. The first view, enshrined in the
Restatement of Contracts, 4 holds that it is insufficient that a term
take a party unaware and that, in addition to the surprising nature
53. See Rubin, supra note 15 and accompanying text.
54. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 211(3) (1981).
"Standardized Agreements" provides " [w]here the other party has reason to
believe that the party manifesting assent would not do so if he knew that the
writing contained a particular term, the term is not part of the agreement." Id
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of a provision, there must be a finding that incorporation of the
provision, as part of ISP98 as a whole, would prompt a reasonable
person to elect not to incorporate the ISP. In other words, it is,
under the Restatement of Contracts, a mistake to look to the
provision alone in determining its fairness. Rather, proper analysis
requires evaluation of the entire complex of rules that ISP98
fashions. If, then, there are significant benefits to the commercial
parties in the Rules, a reasonable party might take the "bad"
provisions in order to avail itself of the "good" ones.
A harsher view of unfairness is that proposed by the Unidroit
Principles of International Commercial Contracts.5 Under the
Unidroit Principles, a provision should not be enforced if it is
unfair and if the agreement does not call it to the attention of the
party that suffers that unfairness.5 6 Letters of credit are not
"agreements," but they are obligations. Application of the Unidroit
Principles to them when they arise in the international setting
would not be out of the question. In fact, application of principles
of international law may well be more appropriate than application
55. INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR UNIFICATION OF PRIVATE LAW
(Unidroit), PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL CONTRACTS (1994),
reprinted in Joseph M. Perillo, Unidroit Principles of International Commercial
Contracts: The Black Letter Text and a Review, 63 FoRDHAM L. REv. 281, 318
(1994). Letters of credit are not contracts but unique commercial undertakings.
See U.C.C. § 5-101 cmt. (1995). Courts should not apply contract principles to
letters of credit without first determining that the principles are compatible with
the unique nature of the credit. This paper assumes that there is nothing
incompatible in article 2.20 of the Unidroit Principles and the international
standby letter of credit or, for that matter, the domestic standby credit.
56. See Unidroit, supra note 55, at art. 2.20 (surprising terms).
(1) No term contained in standard terms which is of such a character
that the other party could not reasonably have expected it, is effective
unless it has been expressly accepted by that party.
(2) In determining whether a term is of such a character regard is to be
had to its content, language and presentation.
Id. For further discussion of the Unidroit Principles, see generally Klaus Peter
Berger, International Arbitral Practice and the UNJDROIT Principles of
International Commercial Contracts, 46 AM.J. COMP. L. 129 (1998); Perillo, supra
note 55, at 281.
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of the American Law Institute's product. 7 This analysis will use,
nonetheless, the Contract Restatement test. If ISP98 fails that test
of fairness, it surely fails the test of the Unidroit Principles.
This paper applies a second measure for determining the success
of the Rules, and that is an efficiency test. If ISP98 misallocates
costs, the Rules encourage waste. While waste is not always a
proper standard for measuring fairness, it is a proper standard for
measuring the success of the Rules themselves. This part of the
evaluation of the Rules assumes that the drafters of ISP98 intended
to enhance the attractiveness of the standby as a commercial
product that banks sell to commercial parties. If the Rules impose
costs on the commercial parties that banks themselves could have
shouldered more efficiently than the commercial parties, the Rules
are less successful than they might have been. Such allocation is, in
effect, misallocation. It is axiomatic that as a consequence of it,
some educated commercial parties will, at the margin, elect not to
use the product. That commercial party response is harmful to the
interests of banks. Of course, there will be some commercial
parties, oblivious to the misallocation, that will use the product, all
to the banks' gain; however, that instance, a consequence of
information asymmetry and a clear instance of inefficiency, counts
not in the efficiency calculus applied here, but in the fairness
calculus.
In sum, if ISP98 provisions would not only surprise a
commercial party but would surprise that party to the point that,
were the party aware of them, it would not, taking the benefits of
the ISP with the surprise, agree to a standby incorporating the ISP,
57. The position advanced in the text is actually a compromise between
those on the one hand that would enforce any provision in an undertaking,
whether or not it is boilerplate that would surprise a reasonable person, and
those on the other who would never enforce a surprising term that is part of
boilerplate that has not been called to the attention of a party. The Restatement
of Contracts takes the compromise position advanced in the text. See
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS S 211 (3) (1981). Unidroit has taken
the more liberal view. See Unidroit, supra note 55, art. 2.20. See generally James
J. White, Form Contracts UnderRevisedArticle 2,75 WASH. U. L.Q. 315,320-24
(1997).
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then the ISP is unfair. And, if the ISP's allocation of costs is such
that commercial parties will spend more shouldering the loss than
issuers would spend if the loss were allocated to issuers, then the
ISP is inefficient and hurts both commercial users and banks
competing for business.
Regrettably, some of the ISP98 provisions may offend one of
these principles and some provisions may offend both. The
conclusion that a provision is unfair or inefficient does not demand
that the provision be ignored by courts or arbitrators; it does raise
that possibility, however. It also supports the recommendation that
commercial parties not rely on standbys incorporating ISP98 until
they have studied the ISP with some diligence and supports the
recommendation that commercial parties Use ISP98 selectively, that
is, that they demand of the bank issuers that some of the provisions
of the Rules not operate.
The following discussion addresses those articles of ISP98 that
may be unfair (to the beneficiary or the applicant) or that may
allocate costs inefficiently.58
VIII. PROBLEMATIC RULES
A. Scope
It would come as a surprise to most parties to learn that their
obligations are subject to privately fashioned rules not incorporated
into their obligations. Good and fair commercial practice demand
that parties be put on notice that such rules will be governing their
relationships. 9
58. ISP98 is not the first effort by the banks to fashion rules that protect
themselves at the cost of their own product. For an argument that UCP 500 has
similarly in some instances unwisely shifted costs to letter of credit users, see
John F. Dolan, Weakening theLetterofCreditProduct: The New Uniform Customs
and Practice for Documentary Credits, INT'L BUS. L.J. 149 (1994).
59. There is some authority to the effect that the Uniform Customs apply
by virtue of being evidence of trade usage, but generally courts have used the
Uniform Customs only if they are incorporated in the credit itself. See generally
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The scope provision of ISP98 may have the untoward effect of
applying the Rules when a commercial party is unaware of them.
Rule 1.04(vi) of ISP98 stipulates that when an individual
"authorizes issuance of the standby or otherwise agrees to the
application" of the Rules, the Rules apply to the "agreement" of
that applicant.' The term "standby" is a defined term under the
Rules and is limited to "an undertaking subject to these Rules."61
Thus, if the issuer of a standby credit incorporates ISP98, the credit
is a "standby" credit for purposes of the Rules and the applicant's
agreement that authorized the issuance of the credit is subject to the
Rules.
This may strike some as tortured reading of the Rules and a
devious way to render the applicant's "agreement" subject to them.
In fact, of course, all applicants will have authorized the issuance of
the credit because that is what the applicant does in the application
agreement." Thus, all application agreements under this reading are
subject to rules incorporated not into the application agreement but
into the credit that the applicant authorizes the issuer to issue.
The chief drafter of the rules, Professor Byrne, agrees with this
tortured reading: "This provision would encompass the situation
where the application expressly provides that the standby will be
issued subject to these Rules. It also conceivably would encompass
the situation where the standby was issued subject to the Rules and
the applicant, after having been given due notice, failed to object. "63
It is common practice for an issuer to send the applicant a copy
of the credit when it issues. One would suppose that such action by
the issuer would constitute notice to the applicant that in addition
to the standby, his "agreement" is also subject to ISP98.
the discussion inJOHNF. DOLAN, THELAwoFLETrERS OF CREDIT 4.06[1][c]
(1999).
60. See INTERNATIONAL CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, supra note 12, Rule 1.04
(vi).
61. Id. at Rule 1.01(d).
62. For an illustration of a typical application agreement, see DOLAN, supra
note 59, at App. E-19.
63. BYRNE, supra note 22, at 17.
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This reading is both unfair and inefficient. First, it is unfair to
any applicant that is unaware at the time it applies for the credit
that its credit will incorporate the Rules. The suggestion, moreover,
that the applicant can object when he receives a copy of the credit,
is unconvincing, unless it is a fact that the applicant is aware of this
ISP98 rule. In fact, many, many applicants will not be aware of the
rule. Standby credits arise in a host of situations. Many applicants,
however,64 are not frequent standby credit users. They use the
standby when their counterparty, who might include a bank,6 an
insurance company construction lender, 6 the holder of securities, 67
a university marketing its sports program,68 the holder of a
promissory note,69 an agency of the federal government,7' a supplier
selling on credit,71 or an equipment lessor,72 asks for one. These
64. In many cases, applicants are buyers seeking to obtain sales on open
account. Their sellers are willing to ship on open account, but only if the buyer
causes its bank to issue a standby letter of credit payable in the event the buyer
does not pay the open account invoice. These buyers (of propane from refiners
or automobile parts from manufacturers) are typically smaller enterprises. The
transaction is the "invoice standby transaction;" and it arises in many industries.
One can be relatively certain that small buyers such as these are not members of
the IFSA. For a description of the invoice standby transaction, see DOLAN, supra
note 59, at 1.06.
65. Banks are frequent beneficiaries of standby letters of credit. See, e.g.,
Northern Trust Co. v. Peters, 69 F.3d 123 (7th Cir. 1995).
66. See, e.g., Fidelity Bankv. Lutheran Mut. Life Ins. Co., 465 F.2d 211 (10th
Cir. 1972).
67. See, e.g., BMR Gold Corp. v. United States, 41 Fed. Cl. 277 (Fed. Cl.
1998).
68. See, e.g., In re Metro Communications, Inc., 95 B.R. 921 (Bankr. W.D.
Pa. 1989), afl'd inpart, rev'd inpart, 135 B.R. 15 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1991), revrd,
Mellon Bank, N.A.v. Metro Communication, Inc., 945 F.2d 635 (3rd Cir. 1991).
69. See, e.g., Republic Nat'l Bank of Dallas v. Northwest Nat'l Bank of Fort
Worth, 578 S.W.2d 109 (Tex. 1978).
70. See, e.g., Austral Oil Co. v. National Park Serv., 982 F. Supp. 1238 (N.D.
Tex. 1997) (discussing standby securing of an obligation to repair damage to
federal lands).
71. See, e.g., Tosco Corp. v. FDIC, 723 F.2d 1242 (6th Cir. 1983).
72. See, e.g., LeaseAmerica Corp. v. Northwest Bank Duluth, N.A., 940 F.2d
345 (8th Cir. 1991).
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applicants would be surprised to learn that their obligations under
the application agreement are subject to rules they probably have
never seen and that largely favor the bank that issued the credit. It
is safe to say that not only would the incorporation of ISP98 into
the application agreement surprise the applicant; but the applicant
would find nothing in the application of the Rules to the agreement
that would render them at all attractive to him.' Thus, this
"conceivable" reading renders Rule 1.04(vi)74 unfair.
The Rule is also inefficient. The only way applicants can avoid
the untoward effects of the Rules is by educating themselves
sufficiently so that they know about this little Rule in the middle
of a regime that bankers and their lawyers have drafted. Educating
oneself is difficult because the applicant may first learn about the
Rule after the credit issues and because ISP98 is only available from
ICC Publishing Corp. in New York for something less than
$15.00.7'
An applicant will not see mention of the Rules in the
application agreement, however, unless the issuer uses a form that
incorporates them. Sometimes an application agreement consists
of the applicant's letter to the issuer asking the issuer to issue the
credit. In that case, the applicant will have "authorized" issuance of
the credit and will not know that the credit is going to be subject
to the Rules. It is usually the issuer of the standby that will decide
whether to make the credit subject to the Rules. Whether Rule
1.04(vi)76 would apply if the applicant does not know that the credit
is to incorporate the ISP is unclear, but such a rule may strike some
courts as unfair, since it would bind a party to rules when he does
73. It is safe to say that, but for a measure of clarification, nothing in the
Rules gives the applicant more than it would have under Article 5 of the UCC
or under the common law of letters of credit.
74. See INTERNATIONAL CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, supra note 12, Rule
1.04(vi).
75. The current cost of a copy of the Rules is $14.95 plus shipping and
handling charges. ICC Publishing Corp.'s address is 156 Fifth Ave., New York,
NY 10010.
76. See INTERNATIONAL CHAMER OF COMMERCE, supra note 12, Rule
1.04(vi).
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not know they bind him until after the credit issues. Customarily,
issuers do not send drafts of the credit to the applicant in advance
of issuance but send a copy to the applicant at the same time they
send the original to the beneficiary. By sending the original to the
beneficiary, the issuer becomes irrevocably bound.' The cost of
requiring the bank to give advance notice to the applicant is far less.
A clause in the application agreement reciting that it is subject to
the Rules would cost banks little. Making that clause conspicuous
would hardly cost them anything more.
Yet, the Rules put the far greater cost on the applicant.7" It is
worth noting, moreover, that it is more than a rare possibility that
some parties might intentionally or inadvertently incorporate ISP98
into an obligation that it does not suit, such as a secondary
obligation, i.e., a bond or suretyship undertaking. The Rules do not
indicate what course a court might want to follow in that event.
The fact is, however, that ISP98 is a regime that does not suit
dependent undertakings.
Yet, the drafters of ISP98 make it clear that ISP98 trump other
77. For discussion of the issuance or establishment of a credit, see DOLAN,
supra note 59, at 5.01.
78. A similar argument of inefficiency, and perhaps unfairness, might be
made with respect to the scope provision's extension of the Rules to "inter-
related" obligations, such as advices, confirmations, and assignments of the
standby, if the standby itself is subject to ISP98. How much more efficient it
would be if the Rules required the advice, confirmation, or assignment to
incorporate ISP98. True, a confirmer's liability under a standby credit is also
subject to ISP98, but should ISP98 apply to the provisions of the advice,
confirmation, or assignment that arise outside the original credit? An adviser has
obligations dehors the credit. See, e.g., U.C.C. S 5-107(c) (1999); INTERNATIONAL
CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, supra note 9, art. 7. The language of the scope rule
and Professor Byrne's reading of it would apply to those extrinsic obligations.
See BYRNE, supra note 22, at 16. A beneficiary who receives a confirmation will
not see mention of the Rules in the confirmation, though the credit could be
attached to the confirmation, and in that case, the credit itself will mention the
Rules, but not all confirmations attach a copy of the original credit, which may
have been issued by electronic data interchange, that is, with no hard copy to
attach. For an illustration of a confirmation that did not attach a copy of the
original credit, see DOLAN, supra note 59, at App. E, Doc. 2.
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rules that might apply to an undertaking, be it primary or
secondary. 9 This is the rule, it appears, even when the undertaking
is a commercial letter of credit that incorporates the Uniform
Customs. In that event, courts are advised by the Rules to resolve
conflicts between the Uniform Customs and ISP98 in favor of
ISP98.80
B. Documentary Compliance
Documentary compliance is an area of letter of credit law that
has proved troublesome."' ISP98 addresses some of those problems
with a minimum of imagination and maximum resort to answers
that have proved inhospitable to the interests of commercial parties
and more than generous to the interests of banks.
There are provisions in ISP98 on documentary compliance that
place heavy burdens on beneficiaries, heavier burdens than
beneficiaries might suspect and perhaps heavier than are necessary
even to protect bank issuers."
C. Standard ofDocumentary Compliance
Issuers must be concerned about the standards document
checkers use when they examine documents presented under the
credit. Rule 4.01(b)" of ISP98 stipulates that examiners read ISP98
79. See INTERNATIONAL CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, supra note 12, Rule
1.02(b); Rule 4.20(b) (indicating that commercial letter of credit type documents
such as bills of lading or commercial invoices are subject to ISP98 rules not UCP
500 provisions).
80. See id. Rule 1.02(b).
81. For general discussion of those problems, the plethora of litigation they
have generated, and the various solutions fashioned by courts and rules other
than ISP98, see DOLAN, supra note 59, 6.02-.06.
82. In short, some of the rules discussed here will surprise the beneficiary
that is unfamiliar with ISP98, for, in fact, the rules do not reflect current practice
and are in some respects major departures from current practice, as the text
explains.
83. See INTERNATIONAL CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, supra note 12, Rule
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documentary compliance rules "in the context of standard standby
practice."' One must question seriously the notion that there is any
such standard standby practice. If there isn't, this rule is an
invitation to ad hoc standards.8 5 It is clear to anyone familiar with
bank drafting efforts to deal with the documentary compliance
issue that this rule stems from bankers' concerns that the
documentary examination process not be evaluated without due
regard for the banking exigencies of that process. Courts must take
account of the fact that clerical staff conduct the documentary
examination and that the cost of error can be significant.16 Thus,
failure to reckon the banking exigencies into the application of
documentary compliance issues can lead to bizarre results.8" No
rules and no law in a principled regime should rest on adherence to
mythical standards.
The notion that there are standards is actually easier to make
than the opposite assertion. UCP 500 recognizes the notion,88 as
does Article 5 of the UCC.' Yet, such recognition should not
absolve banks from proving these assertions. Under U.S. law, a
party relying on trade usage must prove the existence and scope of
that usage as fact.9" ISP98 assert in Rule 1.03 that ISP98 should be
4.01(b).
84. Id UCP 500 commands document examiners to determine that the
beneficiary's documents comply with the terms of the credit and that in making
that determination, the examiners follow "international standard banking
practice as reflected in these Articles." INTERNATIONAL CHAMBER OF
COMMERCE, supra note 9, art. 13(a).
85. Some authorities close to the UCP drafting process acknowledge that
similar language in the UCP rests on mythical notions. See Bernard Wheble,
What's Behind the UCP Article 13 Phrase "International Standard Banking
Practice?," DOCUMENTARY CREDITSINSIGHT (ICC, Paris), Autumn 1996, at 11.
86. See generally John F. Dolan, Strict Compliance with Letters of Credit:
Striking a Fair Balance, 102 BANKING L.J. 18 (1985).
87. See, e.g., Crocker Commercial Servs., Inc. v. Countryside Bank, 538 F.
Supp. 1360 (N.D. Ill. 1981).
88. See INTERNATIONAL CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, supra note 9, art. 13 (a).
89. See U.C.C. § 5-108(e) (1999).
90. See id. § 1-205(2).
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"interpreted as mercantile usage."91 Interpreting them as usage
would normally require the courts to resolve questions of
interpretation as matters of law.92 Interpreting them as usage,
however, must abide proof that they are usage. In any number of
respects it is demonstrable that ISP98 is legislative, that is, an
instance of rule making, not codification of trade usage, which by
definition consists of rules that are already observed. 3
It would be decidedly unfair, furthermore, to apply
international banking usages to commercial parties who are not
familiar with them. When two banks with international
departments contest an issue governed by international standby
letter of credit practices, it would make sense to apply those
practices; but it does not make sense to apply them to parties
unfamiliar with such usages. The Rules' assertion that they are to
be construed "in the context of applicable practice"94 may bind
banks or others who are or should be aware of such practice,
assuming they are proved, but might not bind those who are not
aware of them, as many commercial parties would not be. If ISP98
incorporates into the Rules all standby usages that can be proved,
the Rules may be harshly inefficient by forcing commercial parties
to learn practices of another industry.
ISP98 makes it clear that banks are not subject to usages with
which they may be unfamiliar."
91. INTERNATIONAL CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, supra note 12, Rule 1.03.
92. See U.C.C. S 1-205(a)(1999).
93. The demonstrably legislative nature of ISP98 is evident in rules relating
to the definition of "confirmer," the requirement that drafts be negotiable,
practices relating to presentation at the counters of an issuer when the credit is
confirmed, and the rules on determining whether a document is an original. For
discussion of these questions more fully, see DOLAN, supra note 59, at 4.09(3).
94. INTERNATIONAL CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, supra note 12, Rule 1.11;
cf id Rule 2.01(a) (similar language describing issuer's undertaking) and Rule
4.01(b) (providing that document examination shall be determinedin accordance
with the terms of the standby and the rules of ISP98, "which are to be read in the
context of standard standby practice").
95. See INTERNATIONAL CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, supra note 12, Rule
1.08(d) (providing that issuers are not responsible for "law or practice other than
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D. Official Documents
Under Rule 4.19(v), official documents presented by a
beneficiary under a standby must be certified even if the credit does
not speak to the certification requirement. 6 A call for certification
is probably not unusual for such documents. Yet, under the strict
compliance rule that normally applies to documents submitted
under a letter of credit, an issuer cannot insist on a certified
document unless the credit calls for one.97 Incorporation of ISP98,
banks will undoubtedly argue, renders certification a requirement
even if the credit only calls for a copy of the document. The cost of
including language in the credit requiring certification is slight,
while the cost to beneficiaries to learn of Rule 4.19(v) is major.
E. Mirror Image Rule
Similarly, Rule 4.09(c) requires some certificates to contain the
mirror image of language that appears in the credit. The Rule
stipulates that the beneficiary submitting documents under a credit
that calls for language that is "exact" or "identical" to quoted
language in the credit must present a document with all words,
numbers, and other symbols, including typographical errors,
spelling, punctuation, spacing, blank lines, and the like exactly as
they appear in the standby. 98 Byrne claims that this provision calls
for "slavish" conformity between the wording, spacing, and
punctuation of the credit and the document submitted by the
beneficiary. 9  Paul Turner has criticized the provision, justly, by
that chosen in the standby or applicable at the place of issuance"). Cf. U.C.C.
5-108(f(3) & cmt. 10.
96. See INTERNATIONAL CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, supra note 12, Rule
4.19(v).
97. Cf. Bank of Canton, Ltd. v. Republic Nat'l Bank, 509 F. Supp. 1310
(S.D.N.Y. 1980), affd, 636 F.2d 30 (2d Cir. 1980) (finding that issuer cannot add
condition to certificate if condition is not stated in credit itself).
98. See INTERNATIONAL CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, supra note 12, Rule
4.09(v).
99. See BYRNE, supra note 22, at 164.
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virtue of its potential to trap even a careful lawyer or beneficiary. 100
Under the rule, a beneficiary that elects to choose an appropriate
option will render the document non-complying. A credit might
call for the beneficiary's certificate that the applicant has "missed (a)
an interest payment or (b) a principle payment." If the applicant
misses an interest payment, the beneficiary will be tempted to
certify that the applicant missed an interest payment. Such
certification would be non-conforming and would give the issuer
grounds to dishonor the beneficiary's demand for payment. Under
this mirror image rule, the beneficiary must recite that the applicant
"missed (a) an interest payment or (b) a principle payment." And,
he better not correct the spelling error. The rule would also trap
the unwary beneficiary whose clerk assumes that "California" can
be abbreviated to "CA"or that "U.S." and "United States" are
exactly equivalent. Of course, beneficiaries apprised of the rule have
no excuse for failing to comply with it. It is salutary law that
requires a beneficiary to examine the credit before relying on it.10'O
One wonders what conceivable reason the drafters had for
resorting to this procrustean rule. Sometimes, standby credits call
'for lengthy documentation, and an issuer might prefer a document
from the beneficiary that its scanners can check to see that there are
no alterations. Yet, issuers who need such documentation can easily
provide the documents to the beneficiary as exhibits to the credit
and require the beneficiary to execute the original copy of a
document, with appropriate blanks filled in or boxes checked.
The mirror image requirement of Rule 4.09(c) is inefficient and
may strike courts as unfair.
100. See Turner, supra note 48.
101. As a general rule, courts will not redraft a letter of credit in order to
make it possible for the beneficiary to comply with its conditions. See, e.g.,
Corporacion De Mercadeo Agricola v. Mellon Bank Int'l, 608 F.2d 43, 47 (2d
Cir. 1979). "No prudent lawyer would counsel his client to accept a letter of
credit without knowing its specific terms." In re Sunflower Racing, Inc., 219 B.R.
587, 601 (Bankr. D. Kan. 1998), affld, 226 B.R. 673 (D. Kan. 1998). There is
contrary authority, however. See DOLAN, supra note 59, at 4.08[1].
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F. Demands
It is efficient letter of credit practice for the beneficiary to
include in its demand on the issuer certain data that will help the
issuer locate the credit that governs the transaction, determine the
documentary requirements of the credit, examine the documents
promptly, and ensure that the credit has not expired. Such data
might include the date when the demand is made, the amount
demanded, and the beneficiary's signature. If an issuer seeks to have
the beneficiary include such detail in its demand, the easiest way to
ensure that the beneficiary complies with the requirement is to
insert a clause in the credit requiring that information. ISP98 Rule
4.16 relieves banks, however, from that simple duty by requiring
a beneficiary to include that data in its demand even though the
credit does not require it. The rule goes further by commanding
that the demand be "directed to the issuer or the nominated
person." 02
Similarly, Rule 3.03 stipulates the eminently sensible
requirement that the demand identify the standby.103 Such a
requirement is obviously important to a bank issuer that may have
thousands of outstanding standby credits, hundreds of them,
perhaps, in favor of the beneficiary that is making the demand.
Bankers should not spend time hunting for the standby but will
want to call it up on their word processors quickly by using the
identification data included in-the demand. Yet, it has long been the
tradition that letters of credit specify these requirements in the text
of the credit itself,1° not in some set of rules incorporated by
reference. The cost of putting that information in the standby
software would be puny compared to the cost on the beneficiary
that must learn this rule and that might easily fail to include this
information if the credit does not call for it. The Rule renders any
draft or demand that does not identify the credit noncompliant
102. INTERNATIONAL CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, supra note 12, Rule
4.16(b)(i).
103. See id. Rule 4.16.
104. For an early case, see Coolidge v. Payson, 15 U.S. 66 (1817).
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even when the credit does not contain that requirement."05
A similar provision in Rule 4.08 that a standby, even when it
does not call for a demand explicitly, is not properly called on by
the beneficiary unless it includes a demand in the package of
documents it presents to the issuer, is subject to the same criticism
and the same wonder that the drafters would include such a rule in
ISP98 when the cost of putting the requirement in the credit is so
small. Traditionally, issuers have included that requirement in their
credits.0 ' Even if the issuer forgets to include the requirement, the
cost to the issuer is not great, though it will have to hunt for the
standby and may have to call someone on the phone to find out
what is going on. Yet, under this rule, if the issuer fails to observe
what is now standard practice and leaves out the requirement for
the demand, the beneficiary that does not present one will have
made a non-complying presentation and may lose the entire benefit
of the standby.
G. Certificates ofDefault
In a fashion similar to that associated with demands, ISP98
stipulates the content of a certificate of default. Most standby
credits, except direct pay credits,'07 call for two documents: a
demand or a draft and a certificate, usually a certificate of default.
Thus, by legislating the data content of these two documents, ISP98
105. The fact that the issuer may, on its own motion, waive this requirement
is insufficient protection for the beneficiary. See INTERNATIONAL CHAMBER OF
COMMERCE, supra note 12, Rule 3.11 (a) (ii). The issuer will be inclined to invoke
Rule 3.03 and decline a waiver at the precise time that it matters most to the
beneficiary: when the applicant is insolvent.
106. For cases involving litigation of that requirement, see for example, Tosco
Corp. v. FDIC, 723 F.2d 1242 (6th Cir. 1983); Datapoint Corp. v. M & IBank, 665
F. Supp. 722 (W.D. Wis. 1987); FirstBank v. Paris Savs. &LoanAss'n, 756 S.W.2d
329 (Tex. App. 1988).
107. A direct pay standby credit is unusual in that it is a standby under
which the parties expect to make payments. Most standby credits are drawn on
only if there is a breach of some kind in the underlying transaction. For a
definition, see BYRNE, supra note 22, at 3.
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is essentially covering all of the bases.
Rule 4.17(a) stipulates that the certificate of default must include
a "representation to the effect that payment is due because a
drawing event described in the standby has occurred.""1 8 Once
again, a beneficiary unlettered in ISP98 rules could reasonably
assume that, absent specific reference in the credit to the data
content of the certificate, any certificate of default is adequate if it
recites that there has been a default. Note, once again, the simplicity
and efficiency of a regimen without Rule 4.17(a). Issuers under that
regimen would have to include in the standby the language that
they deem important. Absent such language, any certificate would
do.'o Certainly the cost of including the language in the credit
would be small. Most credit forms contain blanks in which the
issuer describes the documents that must be presented in order to
obtain payment under the credit. Thus, the issuer usually must
attend to the blank and can insist on any necessary language or
other data content at that point.
Significantly, Rule 4.17 contains other provisions for the data
content of the certificate, namely, that it be signed and dated.1
Those provisions are helpful to issuers and yet they are probably
innocuous. Most beneficiaries will know that they should sign their
certificates and most will date their signatures. The offensive feature
of the first provision, that the certificate use ISP98 language to
describe the default, lies in the fact that it is unexpected.
108. INTERNATIONAL CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, supra note 12, Rule
4.17(a).
109. See, e.g., First Bank v. Paris Savs. & Loan Ass'n, 756 S.W.2d 329 (Tex.
Ct. App. 1988). Cf United States v. Sun Bank, 609 F.2d 832 (5th Cir. 1980)
(holding that issuer cannot insist on certificate if credit does not call for one).
110. See INTERNATIONAL CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, supra note 12, Rule
4.17(b)-(c).
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IX. OTHER UNFAIR PROVISIONS
A. Waivers ofRights
1. The Beneficiaries
The problem of documentary discrepancies has plagued letter
of credit practice and creates serious problems for the credit as a
commercial product. If beneficiaries cannot be relatively certain
that they can comply with the credit's documentary conditions,
they will not want the credit. In commercial letters of credit, where
the documentation is often more complicated and the documents
more numerous than in the standby transaction,... documentary
discrepancies are frequent. In fact, the history of the UCP
indicates that it was a desire to give beneficiaries notice of what
issuers expected that prompted banks to undertake the UCP as a
project.1
It is an- efficient and judicially sanctioned response to the
problem of frequent documentary discrepancies in the letter of
credit industry for issuers that receive nonconforming documents
to ask their applicants whether they will waive the discrepancies
and permit the issuer to pay the beneficiary despite them.14 That
practice of obtaining the applicant's waiver of discrepancies is much
less likely to occur in the standby credit transaction than in the
commercial letter of credit transaction. In the commercial letter of
credit transaction, usually the applicant wants the beneficiary to be
111. A typical commercial letter of credit will call for a draft, commercial
invoice, shipping document, packing list, insurance certificate, and, possibly,
customs documents. For description of the commercial letter of credit
transaction, see JOHN DOLAN, COMMERCIAL LAW, TERMS AND TRANSACTION
39-50 (2d ed. 1997); CLAYTON P. GILLETTE & STEVEN WALT, SALES LAW,
DOMESTIC AND INTERNATIONAL 369-84 (1999).
112. See generally Boris Kozolchyk, Strict Compliance and the Reasonable
Document Checker, 56 BROOK. L. REV. 45, 47-49 (1990).
113. See generally DOLAN, supra note 59, 4.06[1] and authority cited
therein.
114. See U.C.C. S 5-108 cmt. 2, para 4 (1999).
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paid because the applicant wants the goods that the beneficiary is
shipping in the underlying sales transaction. In the standby
transaction, the applicant's financial demise or its breach of an
executory obligation prompts the beneficiary's draw under the
credit.
Sometimes, beneficiaries know that their documents are
discrepant, but they present them to the issuer under the credit and
ask the issuer to seek the applicant's waiver. Some cases hold that
such a request by the beneficiary amounts to its own waiver of
rights under the credit."' That authority is questionable, since
waiver is the intentional relinquishment of a known right. In fact,
the beneficiary's belief to the contrary notwithstanding, the
documents might conform. If they do, the beneficiary's request that
the issuer seek a waiver from the applicant should not waive the
beneficiary's claim against the issuer for improper dishonor. It may
be that the rule of these cases is in the nature of an estoppel, rather
than waiver. Under estoppel reasoning, the beneficiary's request
that the issuer seek a waiver might lull the issuer into thinking that
it need not examine the documents and need not give the notices
required if the documents are defective."' By not giving the notices,
the issuer would itself be subject to a preclusion rule that operates
as an estoppel without the need to show detriment and reliance."'
ISP98 carries the waiver rule against the beneficiary a step
beyond the case law and a giant leap beyond its reason. Under Rule
5.06 if the issuer notifies the beneficiary that the documents are
discrepant and if the beneficiary at that time, i.e., after the issuer has
given the notice, a time when it cannot be lulled into a trap that
will cause it to be estopped, asks the issuer to request the applicant's
115. See, e.g., Alaska Textile Co. v. Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A., 982 F.2d
813 (2d Cir. 1992); Merchants Bank v. Credit Suisse Bank, 585 F. Supp. 304
(S.D.N.Y. 1984).
116. See INTERNATIONAL CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, supra note 12, Rule
5.01; cf INTERNATIONAL CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, supra note 9, art. 14(d).
117. See U.C.C. 5 5-108(c) (1999); INTERNATIONAL CHAMBER OF
COMMERCE, supra note 9, art. 14(e); INTERNATIONAL CHAMBER OF
COMMERCE, supra note 12, Rule 5.03.
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waiver, the rule makes the request a waiver of rights under the
credit. Rule 5.06(c) (i) stipulates that the beneficiary that makes that
request has waived its right to claim that the documents comply.
This rule is doubly inefficient for putting on the beneficiary a
burden it would not reasonably expect and for discouraging
beneficiaries from asking the issuer to present the demand to the
applicant in situations where the beneficiary might reasonably
assume the applicant will honor the demand.
2. The Applicants
Applicants as well as beneficiaries may be surprised to learn that
there lurks in ISP98 an applicant-preclusion provision. Rule 5.09(a)
requires the applicant to examine the documents after the issuer
pays and forwards them to the applicant. The applicant's failure to
notify the issuer within a reasonable time of any discrepancies
operates to preclude the applicant from raising the discrepancies in
a claim against the issuer for improperly honoring the beneficiary's
demand for payment. 118
The preclusion rules of letter of credit law correctly operate
without regard to reliance and detriment. Thus, under Rule 5.09(c)
of ISP98 an issuer that pays over defective documents may claim
reimbursement from the applicant unless the applicant gives the
notice.
The serious objection to Rule 5.09(a) lies in the fact that it is
hidden in ISP98 and that many applicants will be unaware of it.
The rule adopts what is probably an obscure line of authority under
current law precluding the applicant if it fails to notify the issuer of
defects promptly;1 9 and it probably will surprise the applicant,
118. See INTERNATIONAL CHAAmER OF COMMERCE, supra note 12, Rule
5.09(c).
119. See, e.g., PetraInt'l Banking Corp. v. First Am. Bank, 758 F. Supp. 1120
(E.D. Va. 1991), affid, 953 F.2d 1383 (4th Cir. 1992). But cf. Oei v. Citibank,
N.A., 957 F. Supp. 492 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (holdingthat applicant's failure to object
to documents did not constitute waiver if applicant was unaware of defects);
Overseas Trading Corp. v. Irving Trust Co., 82 N.Y.S.2d 72 (Sup. Ct. 1948)
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even a seasoned letter of credit applicant. The nature of the
document examination process and the customary rules that relate
to it reenforce the surprise and evince the policy weakness of the
rule. Under standard letter of credit law, the issuer must examine
the documents to determine whether they comply with the terms
of the credit."0 There is convincing authority that between the issuer
and the beneficiary an issuer may not, under UCP 500, abdicate that
responsibility by submitting the documents to the applicant for
examination.2 Article 5 permits an issuer to abdicate the
responsibility with respect to the applicant, assuming that the issuer
pays the beneficiary." The issuer's right to abdicate arises if the
right is "established between the issuer and the applicant by
agreement or by custom." '' While ISP98 is probably not custom,
unless a party marshals proof that they are custom," incorporation
of ISP98 into the standby probably renders the rule of 5.09(a) a
matter of agreement.
Thus, any applicant that reasonably expects that, absent custom
or agreement, the issuer will examine the documents and will
relieve the applicant from the obligation of examining them is
going to be surprised. The result of that surprise, moreover, is not
a minor result. It is the whole ball game. Invocation of the
preclusion in Rule 5.09(a) should not rest on a provision deep
within ISP98. It should be a matter of concern, moreover, that
there is no discernable benefit to the issuer in the applicant's post-
payment notice of defects. By the time the issuer receives the
(same).
120. See U.C.C. S 5-108(b) (1999); INTERNATIONAL CHAMBER OF
COMMERCE, supra note 9, art. 13(b); INTERNATIONAL CHAMBER OF
COMMERCE, supra note 12, Rule 5.01(a).
121. See Bankers Trust Co. v. State Bank of India, 1 Lloyd's Rep. 587 (Q.B.
1991), appeal dismissed, 2 Lloyd's Rep. 443 (C.A. 1991).
122. See U.C.C. § 5-108 cmt. 1, para. 6 (1999). The assertion that the
abdication arises only if the issuer pays the beneficiary, rests on the fact that the
comment refers to the right of reimbursement from the applicant, a right that
arises only if the issuer has paid. See id. S 5-108(i)(1).
123. Id. 5 5-108 cmt. 2, para 6.
124. See supra notes 88-93 and accompanying text.
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notice, it will have paid the beneficiary."' In a rational, fair regime,
an issuer that seeks to effect such a preclusion should give an
inexpensive yet explicit notice in the letter that covers transmittal
of the documents to the applicant, such as the following:
"NOTICE: Under ISP98 Rule 5.09(a) you have only a reasonable
time to examine these documents for defects and will be precluded
from claiming that any of these documents are defective unless you
examine them and notify us of any defect(s) promptly."
Regrettably, ISP98 Rule 5.09(a) requires nothing from the issuer
and, under the circumstances, will often result in a preclusion that
would be patently unfair.
X. CONCLUSION
To date, there are no cases from courts or arbitrators construing
ISP98, but there is a body of jurisprudence that grapples with the
policy on the one hand of giving effect to incorporated rules and
giving effect to notions of fairness on the other, namely, the
Restatement of Contracts, and the Unidroit Principles. There is
moreover, decisional law under UCP 500, which to a lesser extent
has fashioned rules unfair to commercial parties similar to the rules
discussed in this paper;26 that may herald inhospitable treatment of
ISP98.27 This body of law testifies for the conclusion that one of
125. One might argue, under a line of authority this writer has criticized,
that the issuer needs the notice in order to pursue a breach of warranty against
the beneficiary that presents defective documents. For cases holding that the
beneficiary makes such a warranty, see Pro Fab, Inc. v. Vipa, Inc., 772 F.2d 847
(11th Cir. 1985); Philadelphia Gear Corp. v. CentralBank, 717 F.2d 230 (5th Cir.
1983). Butcf. Paramount Export Co. v. Asia Trust Bank, Ltd., 238 Cal. Rptr. 920
(1987). For criticism of the Philadelphia Gear line of reasoning, see John F.
Dolan, Letters of Credit, Article 5 Warranties, and the Beneficiary's Certificate, 41
Bus. LAW. 347 (1986).
126. For criticism of those similar provisions, seeJohn F. Dolan, Weakening
the Letter of Credit Product the New Uniform Customs and Practice for
Documentary Credits, 2 INT'L BUS. LJ. (1994).
127. See Kumagai-Zenecon Constr. Pte. Ltd. v. Arab Bank plc, 1997 SLR
LEXIS 152 (C.A.). This case dealt with non-documentary conditions, which
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the costs that ISP98 visits upon the standby transactions to which
they apply is uncertainty-a cost that benefits neither the banks nor
the commercial parties.
Another obvious cost is that knowledgeable commercial parties
must engage in negotiations with the banks to delete from their
standby credits those terms in ISP98 that are unfair. How much
easier to fashion rules that are fair ab initio and demand no
transaction costs in their implementation. Finally, the presence of
unfair provisions in ISP98 will encourage some commercial parties
to eschew them entirely, 2 which of course is easier than going
through the Rules one by one to determine which are harmful,
which benign. Other commercial parties will find it easier to
eschew standby credits altogether rather than conduct stressful
inquiry and deal with the distrust the presence of unfair provisions
generates.
There is much in ISP98 to admire. The Rules are clear, their
UCP 500 and ISP98 tell issuers they can ignore. See INTERNATIONAL CHAMBER
OF COMMERCE, supra note 9, art. 13(c); INTERNATIONAL CHAMBER OF
COMMERCE, supra note 12, Rule 4.11(a). Mindful of the need to follow
incorporated rules, the court held, nonetheless, that it could not ignore a
condition that was crucial to the applicant's obligation in the underlying
transaction. The case in question, so well reasoned and so convincingly delivered
suggests that courts will not enforce rules that effect significant unfairness.
Article 5 has avoided the unfairness in the non-documentary conditions rule by
crafting the same rule but limiting its application to situation in which the
condition is not "central and fundamental" to the issuer's undertaking. See
U.C.C. S 5-108(g) cmt. 9, para2 (1999). Thus U.C.C. Article 5 and the Kumagai-
Zenecon case fashion the same rule. For further discussion of the Kumagai-
Zenecon case, see Adam B. Strauss, Disguised Guaranties: Liability of Issuers
Ignoring Non-Documentary Conditions, 115 BANKING LJ. 1039 (1998).
128. In 1978, the International Chamber of Commerce promulgated
Uniform Rules for Contract Guarantees. See INTERNATIONAL CHAMBER OF
COMMERCE, PUB. No. 325, UNIFORM RULES FOR CONTRACT GUARANTEES
(1978). These rules were plagued by similar overreaching attempts to protect the
issuers of the contract guarantee. Beneficiaries of such guarantees, usually state
agencies, declined to take guarantees subject to the rules, which have fallen into
disuse. The failure of those rules prompted the drafting of new rules that were
fairer to all parties. See ROY GOODE, UNIFORM RULES FOR DEMAND
GUARANTEES INTERNATIONAL CHAMBER OF COMMERCE (Pub. No. 458,1992).
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syntax helpful, a significant advance over UCP 500, which tends to
be turgid and recondite."' The Rules are also fashioned in many
instances with an eye to the peculiarities of the standby transaction
and thus avoid harmful or irrelevant provision.
It is unfortunate, then, that the drafters did not take greater
care, great care, in fact, to resist (a) what appears to be banker
insistence on rules that are in the final analysis not helpful either to
banks or to the standby as a commercial product or (b) their own
inability, as Professor Rubin has described, to check their clients at
the drafting room door.
129. The Rules wisely, for example, leave most questions regarding the
troublesome subject of fraud in the transaction to local law. See INTERNATIONAL
CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, supra note 12, Rule 1.05(c). A major failing of the
UNCITRAL Convention lies in the Convention's attempt to codify rules
dealing with that subject. For criticism of the UNCITRAL attempt to legislate
the question, see John F. Dolan, The UN Convention on International
Independent Undertakings: Do States with Mature Letter of CreditRegimes Need It?,
13 BANKING & FIN. L. REv. 1 (1998). Because fraud questions are inextricably
entwined with matters of local procedural law and because the notion of fraud
itself vary from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, fraud rules are best left to local law.
It is the market that will sort out the problem. Jurisdictions that do not fashion
efficient rules, procedurally and otherwise, for resolving fraud questions, will
find credits issued by their banks unacceptable in world markets. UCP 500 and
ISP98 correctly eschew the fraud question.
ISP98 fashions rules for electronic presentation of demands and documents
under standby credits [Rule 1.09(c)]; recommends the deletion of specified vague
terms that find their way into the letter of credit lexicon [Rule 1.10]; emphasizes
the irrevocability [Rule 2.03]; and independence of credits [Rule 1.06]; fashions
rules for lost, stolen or destroyed credits [Rule 3.12]; clarifies the rules on
assignment of proceeds [Rules 6.06-.10] and transfers [Rule 6.01-.05], including
adoption of the modem rule that a beneficiary's successors may draw on the
credit [Rule 6.11.1]; and imposes reasonable time limits, with a serious minimum
and a serious maximum, on issuers when they examine documents [Rule 5.01 (a)].
In short, there is much to commend the Rules as a regime that clarifies and
modernizes standby credit practices.
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